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CRITICAL THEORY AND THE LONELINESS OF
THE TAX PROF
ERIK M. JENSEN*
This essay has two goals: to suggest why feminist and critical
race commentary (what I'll call the New Criticism) is spreading in
taxation and, in the course of evaluating some specific examples of
the New Criticism, to discuss some dangers of that criticism.
I. WHY THE NEW CRITICISM HAS COME TO TAX LAW

My first thesis-ultimately unprovable, I admit-is that the
emergence of New Criticism writing is attributable to the fact that tax
professors are often isolated within their faculties, set apart by a
sense that tax law is fundamentally different from other law school
subjects.' The New Criticism is an attempt to link tax scholarship
with the work of other law professors and with the work of faculty on
other parts of university campuses. 2 And it's an attempt to get notice
in a way that has become increasingly common in the academy.
Tax professors are the air-fresheners of the American law

school. If a tax prof tries to talk about serious tax research with a
bunch of law school generalists, the room clears out instantly. We tax
law types are expected to sit, without nodding off, through

interminable discussions on Satanism and the First Amendment. But
raise one tax question with a con law person, and he's gone: "Sorry.

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I thank my colleague Jon
Entin for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft. He does not necessarily
subscribe to the substantive points in the essay, and he is of course not responsible for any
defects that remain.
1. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don'tLet Your Babies Grow Up to Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) (describing two "myths," "that tax
lawyers are somehow different from other lawyers" and that "tax law is somehow different
from other areas of the law"); see also David A. Hyman, ProceduralIntersection and
Special Pleading: Is Tax Different?, 71 TUL. L. REv. 1729, 1744 (1997) ("Tax scholarship

and administration [are] already too isolated from the insights of other areas of the law."
(citing Caron, supra)).
2. Decidedly not including the scientists and engineers. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The
Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV.761, 767

(1987) ("[C]hemistry has not ceased to be an autonomous discipline just because there is
more political diversity among chemists today than there was thirty years ago.").
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I just remembered I have to meet with a student. '3
It's not as though the con law discussions are always dealing with
issues substantively more important than taxation.
Whether
expenditures can be currently deducted under the income tax, for
example, has far more immediate consequences to many people
(whether they realize it or not) than the First Amendment's
treatment of Satanism.4 And debates about the nature of the tax
system implicate just about everything important in public policymaking. Not even Satan can plausibly claim that.
I'm not suggesting that con law isn't important, and I like con
law discussions-sometimes. 5 My point is that con lawyers and
others don't return the favor. As law professors, we ought to be able
to explain our work to other intelligent people6 who will make some
effort to comprehend the explanations (maybe even reading an
article or two to help the explanation along). But when it comes to
taxation, the other folks don't even try.7

As a result, tax professors often don't talk to non-tax folks, and
the typical law faculty has only a couple of tax teachers. Yes, we
have telephones, and the TAXPROF bulletin board has brought
quite a few tax scholars together for electronic bull sessions.
Furthermore, those of us in big cities can profit from contact with the
local bar. But Ma Bell, the Internet, and downtown lawyers are poor
substitutes for being able to plop onto a colleague's couch and ask
the "What about this?" and "Did you see that article?" questions that
should make academic life so rewarding.
No one wants to talk to us, and no one except (maybe) other tax
lawyers wants to read what we write. The sense of isolation from law
school colleagues is exacerbated by the perceived reluctance of top
student-edited law reviews, the reviews that non-tax people see, to
accept tax articles. Once in a blue moon a top-ten review will take a

3. Unspoken: "If necessary, I'll go find one in the student lounge."
4. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Where the Action Is: Congress, Not the Supreme Court,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1994, at A15 (noting that Congress deals with hot issues, while
Supreme Court Justices are left to handle bankruptcy and American Indian law cases).
5. Personal liberties are fundamentally important, and perceptions of what the
Constitution does and doesn't permit affect the moral tone of society. But, despite the
great selling job con law types have done, whether someone can bum an American flag
without prosecution has significance to most people only at a very abstract level.
6. Student editors: you are not supposed to challenge-or attempt to verify-this
characterization of law professors.
7. Cf. Caron, supra note 1, at 527 (" 'If you pick tax work, you're already picking a
job that is going to isolate you.'" (quoting Dan Hurley, Why Are Young Lawyers the
Loneliest Peoplein the Profession?,BARRISTER, Summer 1987, at 9, 10)).
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serious, technical, doctrinaltax article, but blue moons don't seem to
come around as much as they used to.'
The problem is twofold. First is the prevailing preference in
legal scholarship for grand unified theories. As Paul Caron has
noted, "Current trends in legal scholarship favoring 'abstract theory'
at the expense of more traditional, 'practical' work may place tax
professors at a competitive disadvantage with their nontax peers."9
Whether Caron's competitive-disadvantage point is correct or not,10
it's true that doctrinal work is not as valued in the academy as it once
was.
Second, tax profs are more likely these days to bypass the
student-edited reviews that other law profs publish in. Those reviews
aren't the best places for tax types if they want their stuff to be
published on a timely basis and to be seen by other tax specialists.
But it's a dilemma. Write for generalist reviews" and you run the
risk that tax professionals, especially those outside academe, won't
see the articles. But if you publish in technical tax publications, your
academic colleagues-those people who think you're from another
planet to begin with-may characterize the work as insufficiently
theoretical.'2 Publish in Tax Notes, say, and you may be slitting your
throat if you hope to be promoted, or otherwise rewarded, for
"scholarly" effort. 3
So what do you do if you want to break out of the tax-peopleare-weird box and be noticed by colleagues who aren't tax nerds?

8. Cf.William J.Turnier, The Changing Venue for Tax (and Lots of Other)
Scholarship 3-4 (Nov. 7, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (providing data showing the steady decline of the total percentage of all tax
articles in major law reviews from approximately 12% in the 1940s to 2-3% in the last
decade).
9. Caron, supra note 1, at 523-24 (footnotes omitted).
10. I'm not sure it is; traditionalists in many legal fields are unhappy about the extent
to which abstract theory has supplanted doctrinal analysis. Cf. Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L.
REV.34, 34 (1992) ("[M]any law schools ...have abandoned their proper place, by
emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy.").
11. Assuming you can find one with editors brave enough to accept a tax article.
12. Without having read it, of course.
13. I wrote a short essay, only partly tongue-in-cheek, urging that Tax Notes, which
has become the tax professional's bible, change its name to something more pompously
academic, like the Harvard Tax Journal. See Erik M. Jensen, Tax Notes by Any Other
Name Would Smell Sweeter, 74 TAx NOTES 641 (1997). It was an issue that struck a
chord, attracting several professorial letters of support and a practitioner rebuttal.
Despite its name, Tax Notes is great. A recent anthology of about 150 tax articles
included more from Tax Notes than from any other publication. See Letter from Paul
Caron,74 TAX NOTES 966 (1997), noted in Tax Report,WALL ST. J., Mar. 19,1997, at Al.
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Here, finally, is my real point: you come up with some highfalutin',
and therefore probably off-the-wall, theory to explain part or all of
the world-a theory that is "'brilliantly' novel and counterintuitive

rather than ... sensible," in Daniel Farber's words. 4 In his The Case
Against Brilliance,Farber wrote, "The ... traits of novelty, surprise,

and unconventionality that are considered marks of distinction in
other fields should be considered suspect in ...law, in which

15
thoughtfulness may be a more important virtue.
By throwing in a little feminism and critical race theory, you can
make waves that the legal academy is afraid not to reward and that
law review editors adore. In addition, you might even get mentioned
in the morning newspapers: "Professor Says Tax System Unfair to
"-fill in the blank with your favorite "traditionally subordinated
group."' 6 Sure, this strategy might not work to make you famous, but
you're a lot more likely to get noticed than if you carefully consider
the treatment of liabilities in limited partnerships.
At a 1995 conference, Edward McCaffery (about whom more
will follow) complained that issues of race, gender, and class have not
been addressed very much by tax professors, who have instead
"focused on more narrow and technical issues in business and
financial taxation.' 7 Those narrow, technical issues are the stuff the
rest of the legal academics don't want to hear about, but they're also
the issues that affect the tax bar-that is, issues that students will
have to address as practicing lawyers. The New Criticism is doing its
part to redress the tax academy's traditional insistence on connection
with the real world of practice.

II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY IN THE NEW CRITICISM
My second thesis is that the New Criticism isn't taking us in a
desirable direction.
I've used more than a little hyperbole to this point, and I don't
really mean to suggest the New Criticism is all bad. If a critic can
demonstrate that the Internal Revenue Code has had unfortunate
14. Daniel A. Farber, BrillianceRevisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367, 367 (1987).
15. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance,70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 917 (1986).
16. See Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction to TAxING AMERICA

1, 2 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) ("What is missing from both the
political and the academic debate about taxes is a serious consideration of how the tax
system exacerbates marketplace discrimination against traditionally subordinated

groups.").
17. Edward McCaffery, Statement at "Taxation and the Family" Conference at Lewis
and Clark Northwestern School of Law (Oct. 6, 1995), quoted in Rebecca S. Rudnick,
Taxation and the Family, 69 TAX NOTES 421, 421 (1995).
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effects on particular groups (call this "mild" feminism or "mild"
critical race theory), we certainly ought to know that. For example,
work on the Code's unhappy effects on women and families is often
worthy of praise. 8 And materials that are marketed as New
Criticism sometimes look surprisingly traditional. 9
But even when New Criticism articles have merit, one might
quibble about how much feminism or critical race theory helps us to
understand discriminatory effects that could have been unearthed
with more traditional analysis and that could have been described
without the loaded, offputting language that often accompanies the
New Criticism.20
And as aids to interpreting the Code as it is and as practicing
lawyers must understand it, the new perspectives are often irrelevant.
Is there really a feminist or critical race understanding of business
taxation, which is, after all, what most tax lawyers do? Worse, the
more extreme proponents of the New Criticism contribute to the idea
that the Code is so morally flawed that it ought to be open to any new
interpretive technique, whether or not grounded in statutory text,
structure, or legislative history. In shaking the foundations of the
Code, New Critics take positions-for example, that the
interpretation of statutory provisions may vary depending on the
gender of the interpreter-that may be inconsistent with the idea of
law itself. Weakening the rule of law is helpful to no one-certainly
not to the practicing bar and our students. 2 '
18. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997); Anne L. Alstott,
Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 2001 (1996). But see infra notes 75-104 and accompanying text (discussing Taxing
Women).

19. See, e.g., TAXING AMERICA, supra note 16. Taxing America is part of a series
labeled Critical America by the New York University Press, and the purpose of the
volume is to "develop an analytical framework [that] would both uncover biases in the tax
law and reveal antisubordination strategies to keep the tax law from maintaining and
perpetuating marketplace discrimination." Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows,
Preface to TAXING AMERICA, supra note 16, at vii, vii. The introductory sections contain
politically loaded terms like "subordination of persons," Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise
Fellows, Introduction to TAXING AMERICA, supra note 16, at 1, 3, and a few of the 14
essays follow suit. But much of the volume is traditional in its analysis. If I were a radical
and had spent my own money for the book thinking it was a guide to the revolution, I'd
want a refund.
20. Cf.Jennifer Hochschild, Book Review, 7 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 416,417 (Sept.
1997), available at <http:llwww.unt.edullpbr/subpageslreviewslsarat97.htm> (reviewing
RACE, LAW, AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(Austin Sarat ed., 1997)) ("[An argument s]tripped of its (to me irritating) linguistic
pretensions ... could be important as well as provocative. But I confess to having a hard
time seeing the forest for all the rather florid trees.").
21. Judge Posner recently wrote that "the foundations [of traditional jurisprudence]
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In this section I examine a few selected articles and books to
evaluate the contributions of the New Criticism. Obviously this will
not be a comprehensive examination of all aspects of the New
Criticism; it can't be. Suffice it to say that in general I subscribe to
the criticisms of Professor Zelenak that begin this Symposium, 2a but I
have a few additional points to make.
A.

CriticalRace Theory: Moran & Whitford

Critical race theory ("CRT") seems to be a posture rather than a
well-developed set of principles. It has been linked to storytelling
(the so-called "narrative" movement), but, in A Black Critiqueof the
Internal Revenue Code,2' Professors Beverly Moran and William
Whitford suggest that storytelling is not a necessary component of
CRT: "[H]ostile critics of critical race theory have placed too much
emphasis on the use of narrative, and not enough emphasis on the
theory of systematic racial subordination in American society." 24
They state that "[o]ne main thrust of critical race theory is a belief
that racial subordination is everywhere, a structural aspect of all parts
of American society."'
I question the use of the term "theory" in this context.26 Is there
really no evidence that would convince a critical race theorist that
racial subordination is not present in one part of American society?
In any event, the "systematic-racial-subordination" thesis isn't used
as a basis for testing. Instead, it provides prepackaged conclusions
for any analysis. 27 Given the extraordinarily broad terms in which
Moran and Whitford describe the "theory," I suppose it has to. If we
posit that subordination is everywhere, we'll look for it-and find

have been kicked away. Today we are all skeptics." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 453 (1990). That's true, but only up to a point. The
whole enterprise-the rule of law-should not be up for grabs.
22. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1521 (1998).
23. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 751.

24. Id. at 756.
25. Id. at 751-52.
26. In their conclusion, Moran and Whitford instead refer to the "critical race theory
tradition that racial subordination infects virtually all American institutions." Id. at 799
(emphasis added).
27. Cf. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 127 (1997) ("[Mjulticulturalism ...
can defeat challenges by depriving critics of any ground from which to mount a
challenge.").
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it-everywhere. 8
Critical race scholarship has been criticized as being "unduly

abstract and ideological," 9 but Moran and Whitford can't be accused
of abstractness. They focus on a number of specific Internal Revenue
Code provisions-involving statutory benefits affecting wealth and
wealth transfers, 30 homeownership, 31 and employment,32 and the
detriment of the marriage penalty 3 3-to

demonstrate how those

provisions discriminate against blacks:

"Our hypothesis is that

deviations

from the ideal

of a

comprehensive

income

tax

systematically favor whites over blacks."'
Moran and Whitford are not always clear in distinguishing
between cases in which the Code has different effects because blacks

and whites, on the average, are in different economic circumstances
before imposition of any tax, and cases in which the Code has

different effects on blacks and whites in approximately the same pretax economic positions. Those two flaws, assuming that both can be
attributed to the Code in the first place, are hardly of the same moral
28. And we'll be inclined to reject, without analysis, any suggestions that the
"theory" is flawed. See id. at 134 (discussing some critical race theorists' characterization
of opponents as being engaged in "backlash scholarship," undeserving of any response
that seeks to engage the criticism on a reasoned basis).
29. Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
147, 163 (1994).
30. Including the fair-market-value basis rule applicable for transfers of property at
death, the reduced tax rate for capital gains, the exclusion from gross income of gifts
received, and the basis rule (usually carryover) applicable to property transferred by gift.
See Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 755 (citing I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1(h), 102, 1015 (1994
& West Supp. 1998)).
31. Including the home-mortgage-interest deduction, property-tax deduction, the
(now repealed) provision permitting the rollover of gain on the sale of a principal
residence, and the exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence. See id. (citing
I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(1), 163(h)(2)(D), 164(a)(1), 121 (West Supp. 1998); I.R.C. § 1034,
repealedby Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312(b), 111 Stat. 788, 839).
32. Specifically Keogh plans, IRAs, pensions, and employer-provided health
insurance. See id. (citing I.R.C. §§ 401(c), 219, 408, 401(a)(1), 501(a), 106 (West Supp.
1998)).
33. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1998) (providing different rate schedules
for married persons filing jointly and unmarried persons).
34. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 753. Moran and Whitford focus on the
income tax, despite the article's title, which seems to look to the Internal Revenue Code
as a whole. The ideal is the "Glenshaw Glass goal of taxing all 'accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.'" Id. at 759
(quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)). It's more than a
little peculiar to characterize a statutory-interpretation case as having established a
"goal" to which a perfect definition of "income" should aspire. The Court in Glenshaw
Glass was merely interpreting the language of I.R.C. § 61 defining "gross income"; it had
no reason to consider the merits of that definition or the legitimacy of the statut6ry
exclusions from income that Moran and Whitford examine.
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order.

Of course it's true that high-income and high-wealth taxpayers
are able to take advantage of many more deduction and exclusion
provisions (and other provisions that have similar effects) than lowincome and low-wealth taxpayers can. That's a trivial point, 35 but
Moran and Whitford sometimes treat it as if it were an indictment of
the Internal Revenue Code as a whole. 6 For example, they answer
the rhetorical question "Is there a black view on income averaging?"
with an emphatic "Yes." 37 When income averaging was available,

blacks were disproportionately unable to take advantage of the
concept, and blacks in general therefore had no reason to think it was
very important. 8
I'm not sure why the fact that relatively few blacks could use
income averaging affects our analysis of whether income averaging is
a good thing conceptually, and I'm bothered by an evaluative
criterion that looks so blatantly to self-interest, even group selfinterest.

A what's-in-it-for-me standard is not something the

academy should be encouraging. 40
But I'm probably being unfair to Professors Moran and Whitford
in attacking the income-averaging point, which isn't the centerpiece
of their article.41 Their more important criticism is that some
(many?) Code provisions affect blacks and whites of otherwise
approximately equal economic station in different ways: "We believe
that, even at the same incomes, the typical black and the typical white
35. My favorite statement in the article is that "[t]he data on blacks and wealth tells
us that blacks own very little wealth and that this lack of wealth is at least partially
responsible for the continuing black/white wealth gap." Id. at 779.
36. I am not defending black-white income differences; I am questioning whether a
Code provision that has different effects on people with different incomes is somehow
morally flawed.
37. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 752. In general, income averaging
permitted taxpayers whose income had increased over a five-year period to pay the tax
that would have been due if the income had been earned ratably over that period.
Income averaging thus moderated the effects of a progressive tax structure.
38. See id. The question was asked by a tax professor in reaction to Jerome
McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DuKE L.J. 39.
39. I have no doubt that blacks who could make use of income averaging liked it, and
whites who could not do so were less likely to be enthusiastic.
40. I recognize that some theories in political science and economics can be
interpreted, at worst, as promoting self-interest to the exclusion of any conception of the
public good, or, at best, as showing indifference to the quality of choices made by
individuals. I'll nevertheless stand by my statement in the text.
41. But they do criticize other Code provisions on the ground that high-income
people can make better use of them-for example, the exclusion for gifts. See Moran &
Whitford, supra note 23, at 762-63.
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lead different lives, largely as a result of the American history of

racial subordination."'42 That's often because blacks and whites, on
the whole, acquire different kinds of assets. Studies show "that
blacks hold a higher percentage of their wealth in consumption items
than whites do, and a lesser percentage in financial and investment
assets."'43 Apparently this asset distribution is itself evidence of racial
subordination. But whether it is or not, blacks can't take advantage
of Code provisions favoring investment assets as much as whites do.!
Moran and Whitford often write as if they were unaware that
some Code provisions are intended to change behavior, not to take
existing behavior for granted.4 5 Surely national policy ought to be
able to encourage investment in financial assets rather than
consumption-that is, to encourage savings-without a charge that
the policy discriminates against blacks. 6 If black Americans aren't
investing as much as whites in tax-favored assets, even when
adjusting for income and wealth levels, black Americans are
voluntarily forgoing tax benefits available to them. Rejecting the
incentives of national policy isn't subordination; it's choice.4
The most fundamental problem with the Moran-Whitford study
is that, as far as I can tell, it leads to nothing but despair. Moran and
Whitford couple their charge of "systematic racial subordination"
with the following disclaimer: "[W]e want to make clear that we are
not asking a question about discriminatory intent.... [L]egislators
are largely unaware of the Internal Revenue Code's impact on
42. Id. at 757.
43. Id. at 768.
44. Some of the Moran-Whitford illustrations are silly. For example, they suggest
that "[d]epreciated properties, such as cars and real estate in inner city slum
neighborhoods, are disfavored if they are capital assets because a taxpayer is often unable
to deduct losses resulting from these properties." Id. at 762 (citing sections dealing with
deductibility of capital losses). If the assets are held for personal purposes, routine losses
aren't deductible for anyone, black or white. Unless I'm mistaken, the cars of whiteseven suburban whites-don't increase in value over time, yet white taxpayers aren't
entitled to take any loss deduction on sales of personal cars.
45. They aren't really unaware of this, of course, see id. at 802 (discussing incentive
effects), but their extended criticism generally ignores incentive effects.
46. Moran and Whitford state, "The lifestyles that blacks lead today may be the
lifestyles that whites lead tomorrow. If whites want to keep the Internal Revenue Code
best serving their interests, they must pay attention to how the Code ill serves blacks."
Id. at 802 n.176. But Congress has no intellectually justifiable reason to be indifferent to
lifestyles that do not promote an acceptable level of national saving. National policy
ought to ensure that excessive consumption does not become the lifestyle of any
significant part of the population.
47. In any event, speaking in group terms, black versus white, misstates the nature of
the behavior involved. Group decisions aren't being made; the group data reflect the
aggregation of individualchoices.
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blacks."' But I'd almost prefer a statement that the discrimination is
intentional; then we could imagine doing something about it.
If racial subordination is really so pervasive that it exists even
when legislators are drafting facially neutral tax statutes, with the
best of intentions, what in the world are people of good will to do?
Indeed, can there be any people of good will?
Moran and Whitford do provide specific recommendations for
change, ones that a hypothetical Black Congress might enact, but
those changes make little sense without an analysis of the racial
effects of the Code as a whole.49 Moran and Whitford say they
"believe that this ignorance is one of the reasons for structural racial
subordination in America, ' 50 but they aren't really advocating a
research and educational campaign.
Instead the remedy for
ignorance is apparently to elect more blacks to Congress: "We
suggest that the Code reflects systematic black political
underrepresentation in the halls of power." 51 That's not a statement
about principle, about law. It's about power, and even then it's
academic in the worst sense. Obviously there will never be enough
blacks in Congress to enact the legislation of the Moran-Whitford
Black Congress. 52 The remedy is therefore-nothing?
Moran and Whitford make it all sound hopeless, but I'm glad to
say they aren't convincing. Despite their gloom, we aren't yet at the
point where the law doesn't matter.5 3
B. Handelman on FeministStatutory Interpretation
Professor Gwen Handelman has posited some feminist principles
that, she says, ought to guide interpretation of the Internal Revenue

48. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 758.
49. See Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1561-74. Moran and Whitford recognize that, by
focusing on only a few Code provisions, their article may be incomplete, but they go
ahead to test "our method," see Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 754, as if a method
that tests incomplete data might nonetheless be valid.
50. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 758.
51. Id. at 801.
52. If it could happen, we presumably would have disproved the subordination-iseverywhere thesis of critical race theory.
53. In a widely noted 1984 essay, Paul Carrington questioned the foundations of the
critical legal studies movement, and I suggest that one of his conclusions applies to critical
race theorists as well: "One cannot believe in the worth of one's professional skill and
judgment as a lawyer unless one also has some minimal belief in the idea of law and the
institutions that enforce it." Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 222, 226 (1984); see also id. at 227 ("More than a few lawyers lack competence
because they have lost, or never acquired, the needed confidence that law matters.").
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Code and the Treasury Regulations that explicate the Code.54 "It
may be time for the bar," she writes, "and particularly tax lawyers
whose work is at the heart of the democratic process, to hear and
sometimes speak in a different voice. 55
Handelman's interpretive principles are intended to limit the
extent to which tax lawyers can recommend aggressive return
positions to their clients. "[P]rivate practitioners, who are not
politically authorized decisionmakers, should constrain interpretation
of a tax statute to the meaning assigned by decisionmakers who have
political authority: legislative, judicial or administrative,"56 rather
than developing their own imaginative-and overly aggressiveinterpretation of a provision.
Although deferring to political decisionmakers has a statist ring
to it, as Handelman recognizes, 7 this is a defensible beginning
interpretive principle. It is, in some respects, a public-spirited
conception of a lawyer's responsibilities. The law doesn't merely
provide a few prohibitions beyond which anything goes; it sets-or
should set-standards higher than a client's narrow, selfish interests
would dictate.5
But by itself the Handelman proposal is hardly a striking
innovation.5 9 Nor is her suggestion that historical analysis should
guide the inquiry into meaning: "A careful inquiry into historical
fact, motivated by a genuine desire to grasp the communication
represented by legislation, offers the best chance for ascertaining how
those who crafted it would have wanted the statute to apply in
circumstances not expressly provided for or perhaps not even
specifically contemplated."6 That means, I take it, that original
understanding, as well as we can discern it, should guide our present
understanding of a statute or regulation. To which I say, Hear!
61

Hear!

54. See Gwen Thayer Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretationof
Tax Statutes, 3 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 39 (1993).
55. Id. at 76.

56. Id. at 53.
57. "I concede considerable unease with the degree of deference to political authority
that I prescribe.... Is the different voice that has found expression in my work the voice
of submission?" Id. at 63.
58. See id. at 60.
59. I don't mean to suggest that's a bad thing, as I've already noted, since much that
is really new or striking in political-legal matters is often nonsense.
60. Handelman, supra note 54, at 55.
61. Lest I seem simple-minded in the extreme, I want to emphasize that legal and
other developments may make applying original understanding impossible. For example,
I don't advocate invalidating the use of paper money, even though the Constitution fairly

1764

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

What makes the Handelman position "new" is using feminist
language to justify and further develop these principles.62 "[M]en and
women might approach the reading of tax statutes differently," 63 and
that difference affects the way we should approach interpretation.
Trying to understand the "communication" represented by a statute
or regulation, she writes, "is an exercise in empathic understanding,
stepping into the shoes of the drafter and assessing what the words
mean from that viewpoint."'
Empathic understanding is a feminine skill:
"[S]tatutory
interpretation as conversation may resonate with women's
experience but is the stuff of fantasy (or nightmare) to men. The
nature of the male orientation and its position of dominance in
American society makes it more difficult for men to recognize a
reality other than their own." 65 Not impossible-"men are not
entirely incapable of attentiveness to others and empathic
understanding if not demanded in a context that requires that they
assume a one-down position '66 -but difficult.67
Whew! I guess that means that anything I say on the subject
should be discounted, but, with some trepidation, I'll go ahead
anyway. For one thing, I'm inclined to giggle at the thought of
"empathic understanding" helping to understand municipal bond
arbitrage provisions or continuity-of-interest regulations.
But that cute point aside, think about how the Handelman
analysis would play out in the real world. Historically nearly all
drafters of statutes and regulations were male. It may be difficult
"for men to recognize a reality other than their own," but the voices
we're trying to hear and understand in tax law are more likely to be
basses than sopranos. The reality we're trying to discern-if we have
to use this distasteful language at all-is a male reality.
Is Handelman suggesting that women are better than men at

clearly does not permit such currency. See Erik M. Jensen, The Meaning of "Direct
Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2334, 2417-19

(1997) (discussing, among other things, the Legal Tender Cases).
62. In an earlier article, Handelman had not adopted an explicitly feminist
orientation to her recommendations. See Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art of
Statutory Construction: A Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment,40 DEPAUL L. REV.
611, 613-15 (1991).
63. Handelman, supra note 54, at 41.
64. Id. at 55.

65. Id. at 68.
66. Id. at 72.
67. This "approach to statutory interpretation requires interpreters to engage in
conduct that may be extremely emotionally difficult for men." Id. at 69.
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understanding what men were getting at when they drafted tax
provisions? Men and women think differently-that's the premise of
the enterprise-but women are better at understanding benighted
To say the least, I'm
male thinking patterns than men are?'
skeptical. If we're really trying to understand gender-based thinking,
which in this case must mean male thinking, I believe I'd hire a male
tax lawyer to do my work. Why compensate a woman for the extra
time (and agony) required to put herself into the mind of a male?
Of course, in most cases we can't actually talk to the drafters to
discern statutory or regulatory meaning: using a legislator's or staff
person's post hoc rationalizations for a provision isn't an oftenfollowed (or permitted) method of interpretation. So the "empathic
understanding" that must be used in Handelman's scheme, as we
participate in the "communication" or "conversation" that she
describes, is necessarily far removed from what it might be in a oneon-one context. Indeed, if we're interpreting older statutes and
regulations, we might very well be trying to empathize with drafters
who are long since dead.
What does "empathic understanding" mean under those
circumstances other than trying to understand a text? 9 Maybe
women are superior to men at reading texts, but I'd like to see some
evidence to support that proposition.70 In any case, it's hard to see
what "empathic understanding" has to do with it.
Now, obviously Handelman can't mean that men and women
think in ways that are so fundamentally different that communication
is impossible. And in discussing communitarian ideals-men are
individualistic, women are communal, and communal is better 71Handeiman stresses that coming to agreement on the meaning of
statutory and regulatory provisions is desirable: "[F]or a national
community to endure, the unifying energy of the federal income tax
68. I think all Handelman was saying in the passages quoted above, see supra text
accompanying notes 63-67, is that women try harder to empathize with men than men try
to empathize with women. It's quite a step from that proposition to conclude that women
are better at understanding what men mean than men are.
69. "Text" need not mean "disembodied text," see Handelman, supra note 54, at 65,
if that term is intended to suggest that history, purpose, and context should be ignored. I
mean only to distinguish a written product from the sort of real conversation in which
participants can derive meaning from nonverbal signals.
70. Carol Gilligan's studies, which deal with interpersonal relations, not textual
interpretation, are hardly appropriate evidence for this purpose. See CAROL GILLIGAN,

IN

A DIFFERENT VOICE:

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT

(1982), discussed in Handelman, supra note 54, at 47-49; see also Zelenak, supra note 22,

at 1560-61 (discussing the irrelevance of Gilligan's analysis).
71. See Handelman, supranote 54, at 58.
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must be preserved."'
All of which suggests that different readings for different parties
isn't the goal, and a good thing too. Accepting the idea that
principles cannot be divorced from the adherents of those
principles-or that statutory meaning depends on the sex of the
interpreter-would lead to the end of serious discourse, and of law
itself. "Focusing on the tax system as a means to strengthen the
community," writes Handelman, "I am fearful of the disintegrating
effects of an 'every-man-for-himself' approach to statutory
ambiguity. '73 I agree with that point, but I am no less concerned
about an every-gender-for-itself approach to interpretation.
Professor Handelman's basic interpretive principles have merit,
but the feminist rhetoric doesn't strengthen her case and it will bring
her few readers from the tax bar.74 The presentation of her theory
may appeal to law review editors and other academics-surely that's
the purpose of the enterprise-but that's not the ultimately
dispositive audience for a theory of statutory interpretation.
C. McCaffery and Taxing Women
In his new book Taxing Women, 75 Professor Edward McCaffery
has expanded some ideas that he had previously advanced in the law
review literature about gender discrimination. Such discrimination is
built-often intentionally, he argues-into the Internal Revenue76
Code, but tax profs focus instead on the narrow technical stuff.
We've worn blinders:
"The mainstream tax policy academy
legitimated the structure of tax with a rhetoric of fairness, neutrality,

72. Id. at 56-57; see also id. at 57 ("Revenue is essential to the practical success of
efforts to address common problems; the process of revenue collection can also identify

and create commonalities." (emphasis added)).
There already may be more common thinking about the extent to which the tax code
should be used to reach redistributive justice than Handelman supposes-or wants. See
William J. Turnier et al., RedistributiveJustice and CulturalFeminism, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1275, 1315 (1996) (concluding "that there is little difference between women and men in
their attitudes toward major redistributive justice issues involving tax fairness and social
spending").
73. Handelman, supra note 54, at 61.
74. See Caron, supra note 1, at 526-27 (noting the relatively small number of female
tax lawyers). Another article that contains fascinating insights that then get lost in a
feminist haze is Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-ProgressiveIncome Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987). The feminist
orientation clearly gives the article a mystique it would otherwise not have. But it also
makes it something to be read largely by the converted.
75. MCCAFFERY, supranote 18.
76. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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and common sense., 77 And we've put blinders on our students: "The
typical tax student, like politicians, scholars, and most Americans,
simply never sees the issues. "78
Apparently no one has been paying attention: "Americans
generally are not seeing the biases and the inequities of tax. The
illusion of neutrality is clouding our vision. ' 79 In short, "a large part
of the obscurity of gender injustice in tax is due to the technical
veneer of the laws."80
It's nonsense, of course, to suggest that the American population
has been taken in by an "illusion of neutrality." To whom has
McCaffery been talking?8 ' What he must mean is that things are
even worse than people thought-very bad indeed-and that we've
underestimated the extent of some particular abuses, like gender
discrimination.
McCaffery's big point is striking: "It was with the more or less
conscious idea of [wives and mothers as] essentially and ideally
domestic, as stay-at-home mothers, that major elements of the tax
law were created."' ' 2 When coupled with the historic norm that
women should stay at home, Code provisions such as those for joint
filing have "the effect both of leading married persons to think in
terms of a primary and an at least potentially secondary earner, and
of then heavily taxing that secondary earner's work outside the
home."83
It works like this: When the lesser-earning spouse, generally the
77. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 1.

78. Id. at 42.
79. Id. at 77.
80. Id. at 96.
81. McCaffery elaborates:
Once we have come to see that tax is unavoidably and pervasively political, and
has in fact been used consciously and unconsciously in the service of particular
political causes all along, we will be well on our way toward a better, deeper
understanding of the life we are living.... Tax is political in spades. It is time
we faced up to this fact.
Id. This is news? The danger with the emphasis on law as politics is that some folks
quickly move to the idea that law is nothing but politics. I've discussed that problem in
Erik M. Jensen, PragmaticInstrumentalism and the Future of American Legal Education,
in PREsCRIPTiVE FORMALrTY AND NORMATIVE RATIONALITY IN MODERN LEGAL
SYsTEMs: FESTSCHRIFTFOR ROBERT S. SUMMERS (Werner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994).
See also ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL

THEORY 271 (1982) ("Law, after all, is not religion, not physics, and not just an applied
social science. Law is law.").
82. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 3. "The tax system is marginalizing women and
helping to keep them at home." Id. at 73.
83. Id. at 69.
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wife, is deciding whether it makes economic sense to work outside
the home, the family thinks of her income as extra income, as
marginal dollars-hence the "secondary earner" label. Her income
therefore seems to be taxed at the relatively high marginal rate
applicable to the couple's combined income. Evaluated that way,
and with all the other expenses of going to work, leaving home often
doesn't make economic sense.84
A lot can be said for that analysis, and-although my comments
may occasionally suggest otherwise-I admire Taxing Women a great
deal. But the book also evidences the excesses of the New Criticism:
McCaffery's rigor is sometimes overwhelmed by the desire to be
provocative. At times McCaffery makes the tax system sound like a
conspiracy.8s The legislators know what they're doing: "We see an
explicit decision to reward the Traditionals, a conscious desire to get
working wives back in the home, and a deliberate use of familial
rhetoric to facilitate transfers of resources to relatively wealthy men
....
"86
But the poor benighted victims, American women, don't
realize what is happening to them because of the "obscurity of tax."
And the voices of critics have, in the past at least, been suppressed. 88
Furthermore, McCaffery peppers his commentary with jargon
that will turn off all but the already converted. His favorite word
must be "gendered," as in "[g]endered tax laws have arisen out of
gendered times,"' 9 "the gendered logic of tax,"9 "the gendered basis
of tax,"'" and so on. "Patriarchy" comes along fairly often, too. For
example: "Women are learning how to work within a structure laid
down in a prior era of entrenched patriarchy .... 9g I'm sorry, but
that language benefits dentists-from all the teeth-gnashing-more
than it helps reasoned discourse. 93
McCaffery's ultimate recommendation is to tax men at higher
84. The Code "leads to massive discrimination against women ... because of its
behavioral and dynamic effects, that is, the way it shapes women's choices over time." Id.
at 25.
85. Even more so than Moran and Whitford, who say they view legislators as
ignorant, not necessarily badly motivated. See supra text accompanying notes 48, 50.
86. MCCAFFtRY, supranote 18, at 101.
87. Id. at 102.
88. See id. at 165 (noting "the suppression of their voices [early feminist tax critics
Grace Ganz Blumberg and Pamela K. Gann] in the mainstream analysis").
89. Id. at 22.
90. Id. at 166.
91. Id. at 167.
92. Id. at 4; see also id. at 269 (noting that women "must work on terms and
conditions shaped by the forces of a patriarchal society").
93. See Hochschild, supra note 20, at 417.
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rates than women, so as to accept reality-women are more likely to
be secondary earners-and to turn around the incentives that now
exist in the Code. For example, "married men should be taxed more
than married women, because men are less elastic" 94---which means
that their decisions about work are less influenced by tax effects, not
that their muscles and joints are becoming brittle
Men should be
taxed "just exactly to the point where their behavior becomes as
sensitive to the effects of the tax as everyone else's behavior is." 96
This idea is probably more a rhetorical flourish than a serious
policy proposal; McCaffery doesn't expect it to be enacted. 97 But the
idea is not intentionally satirical. 9 Since McCaffery wants it to be
seriously considered, I'll do so for a moment.
It's more than a little peculiar, as McCaffery recognizes, to
complain about incentives to keep women at home and then to
recommend a taxing scheme that explicitly treats women as if they
were generally the secondary earners. 99 If the goal is to change
perceptions, I can't imagine any policy less likely to do that.
Anyway, we obviously can't adopt different tax schemes for men
and women in such a blatant way. So, McCaffery argues, "the
recommendation can, and indeed should-at least in part for
Constitutional reasons-be couched in gender-neutral terms. We
should tax primary earners more, and secondary earners less."1 0 But
given that the whole of Taxing Women is an analysis of how things
really are-how the superficial neutrality of the tax laws should give
way to realistic analysis-this suggestion to "finesse constitutional
norms"'10 in such an obvious way is extraordinarily naive.
94. McCAFFERY, supranote 18, at 177.
95. Although they are, as I can attest.
96. MCCAFFERY, supranote 18, at 193.

97. See id. at 278.
98. See id. at 200. One quasi-satirical article advocating different tax treatment for
men and women is Susan Ellingwood, A Broad Deduction, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 28,
1997, at 50 (citing McCaffery). But not all such proposals are intended to be funny. See,
e.g., JUNE STEPHENSON, MEN ARE NOT COsT-EFFECTIVE: MALE CRIME IN AMERICA

(1995). Stephenson seriously and ponderously argues for the imposition of a $100 annual
tax on each male, to make up for the costs male crime imposes on society. See id. at 36062. Perhaps Stephenson's biggest crime scoop is that "young men ...are the likely
litterers." Id. at 156. You name it; men do it and then drop their gum wrappers.
99. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 21 ("However distasteful and gendered this
fact might be,... not seeing that women are far more likely to be the secondary earners
will blind us to a very large set of problems.").
100. Id. at 277; cf. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, ProfessionalLanguage, and
Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking,101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 770-74 (1988)
(discussing "primary caretaker" rule in child custody).
101. Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
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At bottom, the critical problem with McCaffery's construct-as
intriguing as it often is-is that it tries to remedy more than it
possibly can. In looking for villains, as many New Critics do,
McCaffery gives too much blame to the Internal Revenue Code for
women's staying at home and not nearly enough blame to society's
norms. Tax lawyers tend to think taxation drives everything, but
there's no tax reason why a family has to treat mom's outside-thehome income as secondary.
Nor does McCaffery give adequate credit to the conflicting
desires of women. He states that nearly all working mothers are
unhappy: "Full-time workers wish they could work part time, to have
more time with their children; part-time ones wish they could work
full time, to get better, perhaps more dignified jobs."1 2 How can any
generally applicable tax policy take care of such inconsistent desires,
even if we make the questionable assumption that fulfilling "desires"
should be the goal of public policy? Different feminists want
different things° 3-- better work, better support for stay-at-home
child-rearing-and, as Professor Zelenak notes, "Rather than being
motivated by sexism, Congress may be making a good faith effort to
address a feminist dilemma."' 4 Bad policy-if that's what it is-is
not necessarily badly motivated policy.
III. CONCLUSION

We ought to be able to evaluate the merits of legal policy
without using trendy (and divisive) language, conspiratorial theories,
otherworldly standards, and all the rest of what too often is
represented by the New Criticism. Each of the works I've examined
makes good points, but most tax-sophisticated readers will soon
conclude that it's too hard, and too unpleasant, to separate the
praiseworthy from the bombastic. If this is what it takes for tax profs
to feel connected to the rest of the academy, please close my office
door on the way out.

MarketEfficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595,662 (1993).

102. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 247.
103. Different people want different things. There's no market failure just because
wants aren't satisfied. I want a Jaguar for $10,000, but I can't get one. So?
104. Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1540.

